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INTRODUCTION
Countries, nations, and men differ in many ways. Accordingly, one can
hardly expect that their views would not differ. One of the major advantages
of any international conference is that differing views on a given subject may
be confronted and discussed viva voce. Whether a solution acceptable to every-
one can be reached eventually is another matter. However, the very fact that
the confrontation took place may constitute an important stage on the road to
a future agreement, provided that each party understands the other's point of
view. In addition, both points of view must have been recorded and made ac-
cessible for study by the scholar or diplomat who may be called upon to con-
tribute his or her share in reaching the eventual agreement at another confer-
ence at some later stage.
Perhaps such is the case with belligerent reprisals, one of the most difficult
problems not only of the law of armed conflict' but of the entire body of in-
ternational law. At the Geneva Conference of 1974-1977, the issue of bel-
ligerent reprisals still proved to be somewhat controversial. In the discussion
at the Conference, the United States and Polish delegations did not always see
eye to eye: a comparison of the two points of view may thus be useful. This
writer ventures to embark upon this difficult task not merely because he hap-
pened to take part in the discussion. Some of the most interesting stages of
that discussion took place at the meetings of a working group, and these have
not been officially recorded. Considering their importance, they should not be
entirely lost to posterity. This writer hopes to present them, relying on his
personal notes and, at certain times, on his recollections.
* Professor of Law, Jagellonean University, Cracow, Poland.
1. Since "war" as such has been eliminated from among the lawful means of interstate rela-
tions, the term "armed conflicts" is certainly the only proper expression, although occasionally the
much shorter and simpler traditional expression "war" is still in use.
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS
I
BEFORE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1974-1977
A. Historical Background
Reprisals-measures essentially illegal but justifiable in specific cases by the
fact that the adverse party had resorted to them first-were, and indeed still
are, often considered one of the few efficacious sanctions in cases where no
other possibility of securing justice is available. Such cases quite often seem to
occur in war.
However, the essential injustice of reprisals consists in the fact that they
are likely to bring suffering to persons that had nothing to do with the illegal
act committed by the adverse party. This has already been pointed out in
some of the classics of international law-such as the work of Victoria,2 al-
though Grotius seems to feel that suffering is justifiable.' Vattel, though he
recommends magnanimity to belligerents, seems less decisive on the subject.4
That public opinion has shared this view of the inherent injustice of repri-
sals can hardly be shown more convincingly than in the public reaction to the
bombardment by the British fleet of American towns-including the new cap-
ital city of Washington-in 1814. Vice-Admiral Cochrane, ostensibly "with ex-
treme reluctance," resorted to the bombardment in retaliation for damage
purportedly caused by American troops on the British side of the United
States-Canadian border. Secretary of State James Monroe protested energeti-
cally by his note of September 6, 1814, in which he stated that the American
government had disavowed the officer responsible for the damages, and that
to his mind the British action could only have been dictated by "revenge and
cupidity," since in recent times many European towns had been conquered
and occupied by enemies, yet "no instance of such wanton and injustifiable
destruction ha[d] been seen." "We must go back to distant and barbarous
ages," continued the Secretary of State, "to find a parallel for the acts of
which I complain.15
The reaction the case aroused in the British Parliament was even more
striking. Sir James Mackintosh, taking the floor in the House of Commons on
April 11, 1815, emphatically condemned the conduct of the British admiral.
He asserted, "there was very imperfect evidence of outrage-no proof of re-
2. F. DE VITORIA [Victoria], OF THE INDIANS, OR ON THE LAW OF WAR MADE BY THE SPANIARDS
ON THE BARBARIANS 289-90 (Classics of International Law ed., J. Bate trans. 1917) (1st ed. Lyons
1557) (Latin, but a summarized translation appears at 164).
3. 3 H. GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 624 (Classics of International Law ed., F. Kel-
sey trans. [of 1646 ed.] 1925) (lst ed. Paris 1624).
4. E. VATEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 280-81 (Classics of
International Law ed., C. Fenwick trans. 1916) (1st ed. Paris 1758).
5. J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, H.R. Doc. No. 551, 56th Cong., 2d. Sess. 183
(1906).
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fusal to repair-and demonstration of the excessive and monstrous iniquity of
what was falsely called retaliation." Besides, Sir Mackintosh continued, the
very comparison between the capital of a state and half a dozen huts on the
distant border "was an act of intolerable insolence, and implied as much con-
tempt for the feelings of Americans as for the common sense of mankind."6
To observe some proportion between the measures of retaliation resorted
to and the injury inflicted by the adversary, to act humanely, to attack things
rather than men-such were the conditions a belligerent resorting to reprisals
had to observe according to most of the nineteenth-century publicists, even if
the belligerent state recognized the principle of reprisals as perfectly lawful.
7
Perhaps Carlos Calvol and Pasquale Fiore 9 came closest to condemning repri-
sals unconditionally, while others seemed of the opinion that such condemna-
tion would hardly be realistic, considering the lack of other sanctions.
Naturally enough, reprisals, generally accompanied by reservations compa-
rable to those already mentioned, made their appearance in many endeavors
to codify the laws of war. The issue of reprisals thus found its due place in
the instructions for the American Armed Forces drafted in 1863 by Francis
Lieber, which set a model for nearly all future codifications; 10 in the Russian
draft prepared as a basis for discussion at the Brussels Conference of 1874; 11
and in the Oxford Manual of the Laws of War adopted by the Institute of In-
ternational Law in 1880.12 This last text placed particular emphasis on the
reservation of proportionality.
However, no general agreement on the subject could be reached. No spe-
cific mention of reprisals appears in any of the texts adopted at the official in-
ternational conferences, whether at Brussels in 1874, or at The Hague in
1899 and 1907. Nevertheless, one might argue that some of the rules attached
to the Fourth Convention of 1907 may have had a bearing on reprisals. These
rules included prohibitions of general penalties "on the population because of
the acts of individuals for which the population as a whole cannot be re-
6. Id. at 200-201.
7. See J. BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE V6KERRECHT DER ZIVILISIERTEN STAATEN ALS RECHTSBUCH
DARGESTELLT 316 (1868); F. DE MARTENS, TRAITk DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 156 (1887); J.
MOORE, supra note 5, at 182; W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 360 (6th ed. 1909); 1
H. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 510 (4th ed. 1908). For examples of reprisals, see 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1660 (2d ed. 1947).
8. 3 C. CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE 518-19 (5th ed. 1896).
9. 2 P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 214 (1896).
10. The relevant articles (27 and 28) of Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field can be found in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 7 (D. Schindler & J. To-
man eds. 1973). For details of Lieber's University lectures, see Baxter, Le premier effort moderne de
codification de droit de la guerre, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, April-May 1963, at 3.
11. Plan of an International Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, July 27,
1874, 4 Martens Nouveau Recueil 6 (2d ser.) 1879.
12. Les lois de la guerre sur terre, 5 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 149, 159
(1882).
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garded as responsible,"' 3 but also provided for the bombardment of even
privileged objects if they should be used "for military purpose. '"14
In the course of World War I, resorts to reprisal were frequent, especially
on the part of the Germans. Their scholarship corresponded to their practice.
The German scholars maintained their position that reprisals were not subject
to any limitations,' 5 even though most of the eminent writers on international
law from other countries had adopted a different opinion.1 6
In the period between the two World Wars, an important arbitral decision
concerning reprisals was rendered. In the so-called Naulilaa incident case, the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, composed of three neutral members, held that the
Germans had exceeded the limits of legitimate reprisals by not having ob-
served the rule of proportionality when retaliating against Portugal in re-
sponse to some minor damage caused by the Portuguese in the German colo-
nial territory in Africa.1 7
While the general trend in the writings of most of the interwar inter-
nationalists seems to have been directed against the practice of reprisals, a
specific clause on reprisals was introduced in only one treaty, namely the Ge-
neva Convention of 1929 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Its
article 2, paragraph 3 states, "[m]easures of reprisal against them [prisoners
of war] are forbidden."' 8 Despite its brevity and its restriction to only one
group of war victims, this provision had the merit of being the first treaty
rule explicitly and unconditionally to prohibit reprisals.
B. The Impact of World War II: Reprisals in Treaty Law
Many of the atrocities committed in the course of World War II were tan-
tamount to reprisals or counterreprisals, even if no such term had been used
13. Convention on the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Oct. 18. 1907, Annex, at art. 50,
3 Martens Nouveau Recueil 461, 501 (3d ser. 1910) [hereinafter cited as 1907 Hague Conven-
tion] (editor's translation). The same convention was signed earlier on July 29, 1899, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recueil 949, 975 (2d ser. 1902) [hereinafter cited as 1899 Hague Convention].
14. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 13, at Annex, art. 27, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
461, 496 (3d ser. 1910); 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 13, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil
949, 970 (2d ser. 1902). See also Plan of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and
Customs of War, at art. 17, 4 Martens Nouveau Recueil 219, 221 (2d ser. 1879) (author's transla-
tion).
15. See, e.g., Wehberg, Der Schutz der Kuntswerke im Kriege, 2 MUSEUMSKUNDE 49 (1915); F. VON
LISZT, DAS VOLKERRECHT SYSTEMATISCH DARGESTELLT 457 (1st ed. 1925); K. STRUPP, ELEMENTS DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 344 (2d. ed. 1930).
16. See, e.g., de Visscher, Les lois de la guerre et la theorie de la nicessite, in REVUE GENERALE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 74 (1917) [hereinafter cited as RGDIP]; A. PILLET, LES CONVEN-
TIONS DE LA HAYE 221 (1918); Merignhac, De la sanction des infractions au droit des gens, in RGDIP,
at 17-18; 1 J. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 488 (1920); de la Bribre, Evo-
lution de la doctrine et de la pratique en matire de reprisailles in 22 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 263 (1931) [hereinafter cited as RCADI]; C. HYDE, supra note 7.
17. Portugal v. Germany, 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409, 425 (1928) (excerpted and translated in H.
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 951, 953 (1953)). See also 5 RECUEIL DES SENTENCES ARBITRALES
1019, 1069.
18. Convention of July 27, 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat.
2021, T.S. No. 846.
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explicitly. Paradoxically, the civilian population found itself exposed to those
atrocities to a far greater extent than were the members of armed forces, to
whom (with the exception of a few fragmentary rules among those attached
to the Fourth Convention of 1907) the bulk of the preexisting law of war was
restricted. The concern for the treatment of civilians in case of an armed con-
flict was thus the major impulse at the root of the postwar Conference on
Protection of Victims of War, convened at Geneva in 1949. The Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War was generally
considered the principal achievement of that conference. The conference also
provided the opportunity for revising and even redrafting rules concerning
the protection of persons belonging to the armed forces of belligerents
-especially the wounded, the sick, and the shipwrecked-as well as the pris-
oners of war. This time a specific clause on reprisals was inserted into each of
the four Conventions that were eventually adopted. The wording of these
clauses is as follows:
Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or equipment pro-
tected by the Convention are prohibited. 9
Reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the personnel,
the vessels or the equipment protected by the Convention are prohibited. 20
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited. 21
Reprisals against protected persons [civilian] and their property are prohib-
ited. 2
2
Yet another prohibition of reprisals was soon added to these clauses. The
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, signed at The Hague on May 14, 1954, contains the following provi-
sion to this effect: "[t]hey [the High Contracting Parties] shall refrain from
any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.
'
"23
All these specific provisions on reprisals were finally strengthened by a
provision of a more general character that was included in the Convention on
19. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
the Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, at art. 46, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as the First Convention].
20. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, at art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as the Second Convention].
21. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, at
art. 13, para. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as the
Third Convention].
22. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of Au-
gust 12, 1949, at art. 33, para. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
cited as the Fourth Convention].
23. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of
May 14, 1954, art. 4, para. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. 244. An extensive definition of "cultural property" is
given in art. 1 of the Convention. For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Convention, see
Nahlik, La protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit arm6, in 120 RCADI, supra note 16, at 120.
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the Law of Treaties signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969. The Convention pro-
vides for the possibility of termination or suspension of a treaty as a conse-
quence of its material breach by one of the parties. Such a possibility cannot,
however, be invoked with respect "to provisions relating to the protection of
the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in partic-
ular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected
by such treaties."24
Most of the authors commenting on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 con-
sidered the prohibition of reprisals one of the Convention's principal achieve-
ments. G. Draper referred to them as "a very significant contribution to the
law of war," since "reprisals which were designed as a method of enforcing
the law of war have become an excuse for the wholesale and cynical disregard
of the law."25 According to P. de la Pradelle, "[t]o admit reprisals in situations
protected by the Geneva Conventions, would result in excusing any violation
of their provisions." '2 6 J. Pictet, vice-president of the International Committee
of the Red Cross,2 7 acclaimed the prohibition of reprisals by the Geneva Con-
ventions as "a great victory of humanity," especially because of the prohibi-
tion's "absolute character," which allowed no exceptions.
Many authors besides those commenting specifically on the Geneva Con-
ventions concurred. According to the most popular English manual of inter-
national law, written by L. Oppenheim and supplemented by H. Lauter-
pacht, "reprisals instead of being a means of securing legitimate warfare may
become an effective instrument of its wholesale and cynical violation in mat-
ters constituting the very basis of the law of war."2 8 J. W. Bishop saw in repri-
sals "a two-edged weapon, with a tendency to invite counter-reprisals. ' 29 G.
Gottlieb, another American scholar, proposed a revised version of the famous
F. Lieber's Instructions and suggested including in it an absolute and uncon-
ditional prohibition of reprisals against civilian populations, as it was necessary
"[t]o respect paramount moral principles for their own sake, regardless of reci-
procity.
30
Some of the authors of the postwar textbooks of the law of war, even if
they have limited themselves to the presentation of the actual state of the law,
24. Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969, art. 60, para. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf/39/27 (1969). This Convention has not yet been ratified or acceded to by the requisite
number of states for formal entry into force.
25. G. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 98-99 (1958).
26. P. DE LA PRADELLE, LA CONFIERENCE DIPLOMATIQUE ET LES NOUVELLES CONVENTIONS DE
GENkVE DU 12 AOUJT 1949 183 (1951) (author's translation).
27. Pictet, Preface to F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS vii-viii (1971).
28. L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (7th ed. 1952).
29. J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAw 289 (1974).
30. Proceedings of the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 4 Am. J.
INT'L L. 220 (1971) (emphasis in original).
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speak about the admissibility of reprisals with great hesitation." M. Green-
span goes so far as to recognize that "the doctrine of reprisals in its present
somewhat obscure and undefined state provides the chief loophole for the
evasion, violation, and nullification of the laws of war. '3 2 In the light of the
experiences of World War II, it is evident that the vagueness of the rules con-
cerned constitutes "a major obstacle to the effective enforcement of the laws
of war."33
We could hardly conclude this brief survey of selected opinions any better
than by quoting F. Kalshoven, the author of what is probably the most exten-
sive recent monograph on reprisals. After reviewing both the doctrine and
practice of reprisals and then demonstrating against this background how in-
effective nearly all the restrictions have proved to be, the Dutch scholar con-
cludes that any situation "where a belligerent reprisal seems permissible pre-
sents the belligerent with an opportunity to violate a rule of the law of war
with impunity." Kalshoven therefore thinks that an absolute prohibition of re-
prisals would be the only plausible solution, since "the balance of the merits
and demerits of belligerent reprisals has now become so entirely negative as
no longer to allow of their being regarded as even moderately effective sanc-
tions of the laws of war.
34
The Institute of International Law found that the whole body of the law
of war was to a great extent outdated.35 However, the Institute had serious
doubts about how, if at all, the regulation of reprisals was to be included in its
suggestions for change. E. Castr6n, himself the author of an important text-
book on the law of war, believed that "a reform of that institution [of repri-
sals] in the near future is not realistic. '36 J. P. A. Franqois, who acted as the
Institute's rapporteur on the law of war, limited himself in his final report to
formulating the following suggestion concerning reprisals:
Recourse to reprisals in retaliation to acts committed during the war by the
adverse party should be the object of a profound inquiry in order to deter-
mine in what way it would be possible to regulate such recourse in respect of
the means of injuring the enemy. The parties to the conflict should not have
recourse to reprisals unless the facts incriminated have been impartially
clarified.37
These words recall the rules contained in the Conventions concluded at
The Hague rather than those concluded at Geneva. Still, rules on the conduct
31. See, e.g., 2 F. BERBER, LEHRBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 235-38 (1962); E. CASTREN, THE
PRESENT LAW OF WARFARE AND NEUTRALITY 69-72 (1954).
32. M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 408 (1959).
33. Id. at 533.
34. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 27, at 367, 377.
35. 45 ANNUAIRE DE L|INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1954).
36. 47 ANNUAIRE DE LINSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 528 (1957) (author's translation).
37. Id. at 533 (author's translation).
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of hostilities and rules on the protection of victims of war are so closely inter-
related that it would be impossible to regulate only one of these two branches
of the law of war without having, to some extent, the other in mind as well.
D. Bindschedler-Robert also dealt with the interface of these two branches
of law in her report on the law of armed conflict submitted to the Conference
convened to that effect at Geneva in 1969 by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace." Bindschedler did not seem to believe it would be realis-
tic to prohibit reprisals absolutely, although she agreed that this would be the
ideal solution. In her opinion, even the prohibitions contained in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 "do not . . . imply that an injured State cannot impose
sanctions in response to the initial violation of the rules of protection; they
only mean that the State must choose a different form of reprisals." She
thought, however, that one could try to extend the circle of persons to be
protected and attempt to make the recourse to reprisals dependent on the
fulfillment of certain conditions.3 9
In the ensuing discussion, only one speaker 40 dealt with reprisals in the
proper sense of the term. The discussion instead centered on an altogether
different problem: the distinction to be observed between reprisals and the Tu
quoque reservation frequently invoked in excuse of illegal conduct against the
party that later resorted to the same kind of conduct as well. 41
C. Activities Preparatory to the Diplomatic Conference
on Humanitarian Law
In contrast, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was
fairly explicit on the subject of reprisals, especially in its 1969 report sub-
mitted to the Twenty-first International Conference of the Red Cross held
that year at Istanbul. The report was drafted by a committee of experts that
met under the chairmanship of Professor J. Pictet, vice-president of the
ICRC. After having invoked prohibitions already formulated in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the' ICRC advocated in principle setting an absolute
prohibition of reprisals or, at the very least, making them dependent on the
fulfillment of certain conditions. Such conditions would consist of: (1) impar-
tial investigation and clarification of all facts involved; (2) proportionality; (3)
reprisals to be of the same kind as the violation of law committed by the ad-
verse party; and (4) respect of the "laws of humanity.1 42
38. A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflicts, in 1 CONFERENCES ON CONTEMPORARY PROB-
LEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1971).
39. Id. at 57-59.
40. Id. at 76.
41. Id. at 116-18.
42. Riaffirmation et developpement des lois et coutumes applicables dans les conflits armis, Rapport
prisenti par le Comiti international de la Croix-Rouge, in 21 CONFiRENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA
CROIx-RoUGE 96-100 (1969) (author's translation).
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While some of the experts favored an absolute prohibition of reprisals,
others thought that such a prohibition would not be realistic and even had
doubts about some of the restrictions suggested by the ICRC. Because of
these divergences the ICRC limited itself in its conclusions to stressing the
"principle of proportionality. '43
The report of 1969 was soon followed by Resolution Number XIII, unani-
mously adopted by the Twenty-first Conference, requesting the ICRC to draft
rules that would complete the humanitarian law then in force. In fact, this
was only one of several stages in the work on "recodification" of that law initi-
ated by the ICRC a few years before. In taking this step, the ICRC acted in
compliance with a recommendation that had been submitted by the Twentieth
International Conference of the Red Cross, held at Vienna in 1965.
In this brief survey it would be impossible to delineate all the successive
developments. Let it suffice to say that in 1971 and 1972 the ICRC convened
two sessions of experts appointed by various national Red Cross Societies, as
well as two sessions of governmental experts, for assistance in its work. The
first session, convening the governmental experts, was attended by represen-
tatives of some forty governments, the second, by seventy-seven.
In pursuance of this work, the ICRC was continually in close touch with
the governments and the international organizations (especially the United
Nations). The U.N. General Assembly consistently encouraged the ICRC to
pursue its activities and maintained the issue on the agenda of all its consecu-
tive sessions from 1968 onwards.44 All this extensive preliminary work led to
the drafting of two essential documents that were to be submitted to the Dip-
lomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law.4"
In view of the intensity of the preparatory work, the organizers of the
Diplomatic Conference must have thought that the Conference would not do
much more than simply confirm what had been prepared in advance with the
assistance of so many government experts. This, however, was not the case.
The Swiss Federal Council, in its capacity as the depositary of the Geneva
43. Id.
44. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted no less than 23 resolutions on this
subject. For a list of these, see Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, done at Geneva
on June 10, 1977, in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), 1 OFFICIAL RECORD
OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974-1977), at 3-4 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS]. See also ICRC, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFER-
ENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (24 May-12 June 1971), REPORT
ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE (1977).
45. International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (1973) [hereinafter cited as Draft Protocol I]; Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (1973) [hereinafter cited as Draft Protocol II].
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Conventions of 1949, convened the Conference in 1974 for one session only,
which was to last six weeks. However, discussions became so animated, and
some problems proved to be so controversial, that three additional sessions
had to be held, each lasting two to three months--despite the division of the
Conference's work between three main committees.4" The total duration of
the Conference was thus extended to nearly nine months. The Final Act of
the Conference was signed at Geneva on June 10, 1977, while the Protocols
themselves 47 were open for signature only six months later. 48
II
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW
Article 74 of the original draft submitted by the ICRC to the advisory
group of government experts in 1972 unconditionally prohibited reprisals
against any persons or things protected by the Protocol. Because of the diver-
gences of views among the experts, however, the ICRC abandoned its original
intent, and the final draft presented to the Diplomatic Conference contained
no general provision on reprisals. Instead, specific clauses on reprisals were
inserted in no less than five articles of Draft Protocol I. Main Committee II
was to deal with one of these clauses; four others were delegated to Main
Committee III. None were assigned at that time to Main Committee I, which
was to deal with "general" questions.
A. Main Committee II
Article 20 of Draft Protocol I, the only one referred to Committee II, was
the last of those pertaining to section I of part II, which dealt with
"Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Persons." Its wording was as follows:
"[m]easures of reprisals against the wounded, the sick and the shipwrecked, as
well as against the medical personnel, units or means of transport mentioned
in this Part, are prohibited."'4 9
This provision was to replace both article 46 of the First Geneva Conven-
tion of 1949 and article 47 of the Second Convention. One would be inclined
to say at first glance-as indeed some of the delegates did-that there was
nothing new in draft article 20. This was not the case, however, since the defi-
nitions contained in article 8 of the Draft Protocol considerably extended the
fundamental notions of the "wounded and sick,"5 the "shipwrecked,"s and
46. A fourth committee, the Ad Hoc Committee, was added later.
47. INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS oF 12 AUGUST 1949 (1977); also available in U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I & I1
[hereinafter referred to as Protocol I and Protocol II]. The Protocols are also reprinted as an
appendix to this issue. 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1978, at 203.
48. Protocol I, supra note 47, at art. 92; Protocol II, supra note 47, at art. 20.
49. Draft Protocol I, supra note 45, at art. 20.
50. Id. at art. 1, para. (a).
51. Id. at para. (b).
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the "medical personnel. '5 2 Each of these definitions no longer referred
merely to persons connected in some way with the armed forces; each now
referred to civilians as well. In particular, the first of the categories men-
tioned above was to comprise henceforth all "persons, whether military or ci-
vilian, who are in need of medical assistance and care," such as "the infirm, as
well as expectant mothers, maternity cases and new-born babies." The second
included those "who are in peril at sea as a result of the destruction, loss or
disablement of the vessel or aircraft in which they were travelling." In both
cases, a restriction was added that such persons must "refrain from any act of
hostility." Besides, the Committee inserted into the article on definitions still
more elements, so that the circle of persons and things protected was ex-
tended considerably. 53
The Committee brought about an essential change when it accepted the
amendment that the Australian delegation submitted. 54 This amendment re-
placed the enumeration of persons and things to be protected with a more
general clause that specified no particular categories. From the juridical per-
spective, as well as in the interest of clarity, this was a most welcome correc-
tion: it went far towards a general prohibition of reprisals and an elimination
of the possibility of any restrictive interpretation.
On the other hand, after some hesitation, the Committee rejected the sug-
gestion in this same amendment that the term "reprisals" be replaced with the
phrase, "measures in the nature of reprisals." The Committee thought that
the classical term "reprisals" was understandable enough and incurred less
risk of equivocal interpretation than would any enlargement.
The Committee had not the slightest doubt concerning the principle of the
prohibition; the article in its simplified form was adopted by consensus.55 Two
years later, with almost no discussion, 56 the plenary reached the same consen-
sus.5 7 The final wording adopted is the following:
Article 20-Prohibition of reprisals
Reprisals against the persons and objects protected by this Part are pro-
hibited.
58
52. Id. at para. (c).
53. In its final version, article 8 (renamed "Terminology" instead of "Definitions") comprises
13 paragraphs instead of the original 6, some of which are subdivided into 3 or 4 subparagraphs.
54. 13 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44 at 101, para. 108 (1978) (CDDH/II/214).
55. For debates and votes on this subject, see 11 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, sura note 44, at
189, 196-99 (CDDH/II/SR.20, paras. 44-64), and (CDDH/II/25, paras. 4-8). These two meetings
took place on the fourteenth and the twenty-sixth of February, 1975. See also 13 CDDH OFFICIAL
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 53, 101-02 (CDDH/221/Rev. 1, paras. 107-112) (report of Committee
II of its work at the second session).
56. The delegate of Colombia expressed his regret that the Protocol did not contain a general
clause on reprisals, and the delegate of Mexico said that he would submit a statement in writing
on this subject. 6 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 71, para. 34 (CDDH/ SR.37) (ple-
nary meeting of May 24, 1977).
57. Id. at 65, 71.
58. Protocol I, supra note 47, at art. 20.
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B. Main Committee III
The task of Committee III was perhaps more difficult-not merely be-
cause it had to deal with four clauses instead of one, but also because some of
the problems involved were essentially new.
The four articles in question were inserted into part IV of Draft Protocol
I, entitled "Civilian Population." It was therefore necessary to compare them
with the Fourth Convention of 1949. The problem of reprisals appeared
there in only one article-article 33, which dealt with individual responsibility
of persons protected. The effect of this article was to prohibit all collective
penalties and all pillage. Its third and last paragraph reads as follows: "Repri-
sals against protected persons and their property are prohibited." 59
The context in which this provision was placed may indicate that only indi-
viduals and, consequently, their private property were meant. Draft Protocol I
gave the prohibition of reprisals a much wider scope. The statements in the
texts of the four articles as they appeared in Draft Protocol I are as follows:
Article 46. Protection of the civilian population
4. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals
are prohibited.
Article 48. Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
... These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
Article 49. Works and installations containing dangerous forces
1 ... These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
Article 66. Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
.... They shall not be the object of reprisals.
One easily can see the ways in which the protection was widened. Draft ar-
ticle 46 applied not merely to individual persons but to the civilian population
as a whole. Besides, it covered a much wider field: the actual conduct of hos-
tile military operations, as opposed to the context in which the provision of
the Fourth Convention had been placed, which had limited its application to
persons within the territory already occupied by enemy forces.
Three remaining articles entered fields that had been totally untouched by
any prohibition of reprisals until then. Draft articles 48 and 66-the first to
be applied in the conduct of military operations, the second, under
occupation-were meant to ensure that the civilian population would not be
deprived of "food-stuffs, food-producing areas, crops, livestock, drinking
water supplies and irrigation works." Draft article 49 had yet another pur-
pose: to prevent such catastrophic disasters as could be caused by attacks di-
59. Fourth Convention, supra note 22, at art. 33, para. 3.
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rected against such installations as "dams, dykes and nuclear generating sta-
tions."
The Committee did not register the slightest doubt about these provisions
and adopted all of them with almost no discussion.6 0 It merely found that it
would be superfluous to speak about objects necessary to the survival of civil-
ians in two different places and blended the two articles into one.61
Although Committee III left these provisions essentially unchanged, it did
add three more supplementary clauses dealing with reprisals to the Protocol.
The first extended the prohibition of reprisals to all civilian objects.6 2 The
"general protection" of such objects was provided for in draft article 47,63
which had not contained any mention of reprisals in its original text. During
the Diplomatic Conference, two amendments aimed at including a prohibition
of reprisals in this article were submitted. One of them, briefly introduced by
Professor Mencer of Czechoslovakia, was also sponsored by the delegation of
the German Democratic Republic.6 4 The other was jointly submitted by the
delegations of Austria, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philip-
pines, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 65 Professor Kalshoven 66 of
the Netherlands, introducing the amendment in the name of all its sponsors,
said, inter alia, that
there should be either no prohibition at all but simply general restrictions, or
else outright prohibition .... In fact, reprisals could rarely be confined to ci-
vilian objects alone and the infliction of suffering on the civilian population
would be virtually inevitable. The sponsors were therefore in favour of
deciding for or against complete prohibition. 67
It followed from this reasoning that the prohibition of reprisals against civil-
ian objects should be considered merely a logical corollary of the prohibition
concerning civilian persons.
In the course of an animated discussion that dealt with many questions
arising from draft article 47, thirteen delegates spoke about reprisals.68 Most
60. See 15 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 259, 275-84 (CDDH/215/Rev. 1, paras.
58, 71-77, 84-95) (report of Committee III of its work at the second session). The articles con-
cerned were discussed, though not in reference to the clause on reprisals.
61. See 15 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 259, 275-84 (CCDH/I1I/408, paras. 49,
53) (draft report of Committee III of its work at the fourth session).
62. The notion of these objects as formulated by the Committee became much wider than that
of the Draft Protocol. Under Protocol 1, supra note 47, at art. 52 (which replaced art. 47 of Draft
Protocol 1, supra note 45), "Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as de-
fined in paragraph 2." The presumption is thus in favor of an object being a civilian one.
63. 15 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 484 (CDDHI407/Rev. 1).
64. Id. at 113 (CDDH/III/58).
65. Id. (CDDH/III/57).
66. Author of the monograph on reprisals cited in note 27 supra.
67. 14 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 113-14 (CDDHIIII/SR.14, para. 26) (em-
phasis added).
68. For these speeches, see 14 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 109-25 (CDDH/III/
SR. 14, CDDH/III/SR. 15) (meetings of the sixth and the tenth of February, 1975).
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of them supported the idea of prohibition as it appeared in the two amend-
ments mentioned previously and in yet a third one, submitted by a group of
Arab countries.6 9 The draft article with amendments was eventually assigned
to a working group. Ambassador Aldrich of the United States, rapporteur of
Committee III and chairman of the working group, resubmitting to the
Committee the text as redrafted by the working group, asked for a separate
vote on the clause concerning reprisals. In that vote, fifty-eight delegations
voted for the prohibition of reprisals, three voted against, and nine ab-
stained.7" The clause was thus adopted, by a very strong majority, with the
following wording: "Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of re-
prisals."
Committee III also inserted two entirely new articles among the provisions
concerning the civilian population, namely article 47 bis on protection of cul-
tural property and places of worship, 7' and article 48 bis on protection of the
natural environment. 72 The Committee had not hesitated to include a prohi-
bition of reprisals in either of these articles.73
C. Plenary Meetings
Two years later, all of those provisions, after being passed by the drafting
committee, had yet to be adopted in the plenary meeting. In that body, draft
article 46, the first of the articles previously adopted by the Committee that
contained a prohibition of reprisals, aroused some discussion. In particular,
the delegate of France was of the opinion that it exceeded the scope of the
humanitarian law and was likely to limit the right of legitimate self-defense.
He therefore asked for a roll call vote. However, he found himself totally iso-
lated; he was the only one to vote against article 46, while seventy-seven dele-
gations voted in favor of the article, and sixteen abstained.7 4
The representative of the United Kingdom also expressed some reserva-
tions about the article, though he did not go as far as the French delegate.7 5
69. Id. at 112 (CDDH/III/63).
70. Id. at 217, 219 (CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 16) (meeting of February 25, 1975).
71. This article was based on an amendment to draft article 47, submitted jointly by the dele-
gations of Greece, the Holy See, Jordan, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 15 CDDH OFFICIAL
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 277 (CDDH/III/17/Rev.2). See id. at 307 for final text.
72. At the basis of this article were two amendments, one submitted by Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic, and Hungary (CDDH/III/64), and the other, by Australia
(CDDH/III/60). 3 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 220-21. See 15 CDDH OFFICIAL
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 309, for the final text.
73. See CDDH/214/Rev.1, paras. 68-70, 78-83 (report of Committee III of its work during the
second session).
74. 6 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 141, 161-63 (CDDH/SR.41) (meeting of
May 26, 1977).
75. Id. at 164
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The delegate of Poland took this opportunity to speak on the problem of re-
prisals as a whole. 76 Among delegates that submitted their remarks in connec-
tion with draft article 46 in writing, five spoke about reprisals, all of them in
support of the prohibition.77 The representative of the German Democratic
Republic considered this clause so important that his government would find
any reservation to it incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol.
The delegate from France also had some doubts about article 47; in partic-
ular, he thought it was not realistic to impose on belligerents the duty to limit
attacks to military objectives. However, he did not persist in requesting any
additional roll call votes. The article was eventually adopted by seventy-five
votes to none, with seven abstentions. 7 8 Of the written statements, only
Australia's opposed the prohibition of reprisals against civilian objects, al-
though the very same statement supported the prohibition of reprisals against
persons. 79
All other articles containing the prohibition of reprisals were adopted by
consensus. 80 The article concerning protection of the natural environment
again aroused some remarks from the French delegate, this time in writing
only. In this statement, he said that if the article had been put to a vote, he
would have abstained, for the article could have a direct bearing on "a State's
organization and conduct of defence against an invader."'" On the other
hand, several delegates expressed their satisfaction with the clauses that were
adopted-in particular, the delegate of Byelorussia, with the clause on protec-
tion of the natural environment,"2 and the representative of Rumania, with
the one regarding protection of installations containing dangerous forces.8 3
Since the drafting committee made a few minor changes in the texts
submitted to it, it may be useful to reproduce the final wording of articles as
adopted by the Conference at its plenary meetings, renumbered accordingly:
Article 51. Protection of the civilian population
6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are
prohibited.
Article 52. General protection of civilian objects
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.
76. Id. at 166. This speech will be commented upon later, in another context. See p. 62 infra.
77. Those of Australia, the German Democratic Republic, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and
Sweden. See 6 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 175-204 (CDDH/SR.41, Annex passim).
78. Id. at 141, 156 (CDDH/SR.41).
79. Id. at 175, 176.
80. Id. at 205, 206, 208 (CDDH/SR.42).
81. Id. at 175, 186 (CDDH/SR.41, Annex).
82. Id. at 177.
83. Id. at 196.
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Article 53. Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14
May 1954, and of other relevant international instruments, it is prohib-
ited:
(c) to make such objects the object of reprisals.
Article 54. Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
Article 55. Protection of the natural environment
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
Article 56. Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces
4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objec-
tives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisals.
D. Main Committee I
Since there was no general provision on reprisals in the Draft Protocol I as
submitted by the ICRC, the original agenda of Committee I contained noth-
ing to that effect either. The situation changed when two amendments were
tabled during the Conference itself-one submitted by the Polish delegation,
another, by the French delegation, both aimed at the introduction of a gen-
eral clause on reprisals into the Protocol. However, the contents of these two
amendments were mutually exclusive. The Polish amendment read as follows:
New article 70 bis. Reprisals 4
Measures of reprisals against persons and objects protected by the Conven-
tions and by the present Protocol are prohibited.8 5
The French amendment, on the other hand, had the following wording:
New article 74 bis. Reprisals
8 6
1. In the event that a party to a conflict commits serious, manifest and delib-
erate breaches of its obligations under this Protocol, and a party victimized
by these breaches considers it imperative to take action to compel the party
violating its obligations to cease doing so, the victimized party shall be enti-
tled, subject to the provisions of this Article, to resort to certain measures
which are designed to repress the breaches and induce compliance with
the Protocol, but which would otherwise be prohibited by the Protocol.
84. This title was supplied by the Secretariat of the Conference.
85. CDDH/III/103; later combined with Syrian Arab Republic Amendment CDDH/I/GT/113,
10 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 4, at 219. This amendment was dated October 1, 1974;
it was thus formulated between sessions I and II.
86. This title was supplied by the Secretariat of the Conference. One could risk guessing that
it was done without the knowledge of the French delegation, which was rather anxious to avoid
the term "reprisals."
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2. The measures described in paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken only
when the following conditions are met:
(a) The measures may be taken only when other efforts to induce the ad-
verse party to comply with the law have failed or are not feasible, and
the victimized party clearly has no other means of ending the breach;
(b) The decision to have recourse to such measures must be taken at the
highest level of the government of the victimized party; and
(c) The party committing the breach must be given specific, formal, and
prior warning that such measures will be taken if the breach is contin-
ued or renewed.
3. If it proves imperative to take these measures, their extent and their
means of application shall in no case exceed the extent of the breach which
they are designed to end. The measures may not involve any actions pro-
hibited by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The measures must cease, in
all events, when they have achieved their objective, namely, cessation of the
breach which prompted the measure."7
These two amendments appeared on the agenda of Committee I after the
draft articles containing specific prohibitions of reprisals had already been
adopted or were going to be adopted by either Committee II or Committee
III. Thus, the question how to coordinate the work of all the three
committees was raised in both Committee II and Committee III. The proper
solution would have been to appoint a mixed working group. 8 However, the
General Committee of the Conference did not deem it appropriate to create
any new body and decided at its meeting of April 26, 1976 (at the very begin-
ning of the third session) to assign the whole question of reprisals to
Committee I, which, however, was to keep in mind decisions already taken by
the other two committees. The events that took place within Committee I
were thus to constitute a sort of interlude between the work that already had
been done on reprisals in the other two committees and the work later to be
done in plenary meetings.
M. Girard, who introduced the French proposal, admitted that it "raised a
question of principle." The purpose of the amendment was essentially hu-
manitarian, since it would allow the victim of a violation to act as soon as the
87. 9 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 58-66 (CDDH/I/221/Rev.I). This version
was dated April 22, 1976, and was discussed in full committee. It was referred to Working Group
B, and was twice redrafted-as CDDH/I/GT/107 and CDDH/I/GT/107/Rev.1. These later versions
differed from the original in two essential ways. In paragraph 1, the question concerned breaches
only of draft articles 46-50 of the Protocol by the adverse party. In paragraph 4 (of version
CDDH/I/GT/107), or paragraph 3 of CDDH/I/GT/I07/Rev. 1, it was said that the measures should
be "of the same nature" as those to which the adverse party resorted and that they would not in-
clude "any of the actions which may not be taken against the categories of persons ... protected
by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by this Protocol." (Under CDDH/I/GT/107/Rev.1, "ob-
jects" are also included.) 10 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 218. In all objectivity, it
seems difficult not to see the incoherence of these provisions.
88. See 6 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 243 (CDDH/SR.43, para. 1); 11 CDDH
OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 565 (CDDH/II/SR.50, para. 1); 14 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 44, at 171, 173 (CDDH/III/SR.20, paras. 13, 15).
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violation had been committed. This possibility of immediate action would con-
stitute an advantage in comparison with individual penal sanctions, which, as
a rule, could be applied only after the conflict had ended. It was essential to
the speaker that "the machinery of sanctions should come into action, but at
the time when the rule was broken, and when that breach could cause a seri-
ous and perhaps decisive upset in the balance of forces." In order to avoid
placing "the combatant who respected the law in a position of inferiority to
the combatant who violated it," it would be important to give the victimized
party "the possibility under the Conventions of deterring the party com-
mitting the breach from continuing its action, or of obliging it to respect
the law." Still, the French representative agreed that such a possibility "would
have to be limited by strict conditions." Girard went on to specify some of
these conditions; they corresponded to the generally established ones.8 9
In the course of the ensuing discussion, seven speakers decisively sup-
ported the French proposal-namely the delegates of Canada, Switzerland,
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Repub-
lic of [South] Korea, and the United States. 90 According to Mr. Miller of Can-
ada, the proposal would do no more than codify a rule that already existed in
practice. 9 1 To Colonel Draper of the United Kingdom, the proposal intended
to make of humanitarian law "a living reality rather than a series of hopeful
aspirations"; he stated further that "the intention was to repress breaches and
induce compliance with the Protocol. '92 Professor Partsch of the Federal Re-
public of Germany maintained that the French delegation deserved "credit
for having had the courage to raise a difficult and controversial question";
and further, that the proposal "had the merit of seeking to limit reprisals
contractually, which was clearly an advance." The speaker stressed "the princi-
ple of proportionality," which he considered to be "now universally recog-
nized. '93 Professor Bindschedler of Switzerland, though generally supporting
the French proposal, suggested, however, that it would be advisable to widen
the circle of persons and objects to be excluded from any measures sug-
gested.
94
Although some other delegates-those of Iraq, Argentina, Venezuela,
Italy, Spain, and Egypt-found the French proposal worthy of serious consid-
eration, they articulated serious reservations about it that would hardly in-
89. 9 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 54, at 55, 58-60 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 15-27).
90. See id. at 55, 63-66 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 45-55); id. at 83, 89-94 (CDDH/I/48, paras.
25-28, 54).
91. Id. at 55, 63-65 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 45-49).
92. Id. at 67, 73 (CDDH/I/SR.47, paras. 33-34).
93. It is interesting to note that on this last point the speaker departed from the stand previ-
ously taken by many German scholars. See id. at 83 (CDDH/I/SR.48, paras. 2-8).
94. Id. at 55, 65 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 50-52).
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clude them among the proposal's supporters.9 5 The representative of the
Netherlands considered the proposal rather premature. 6
Thirteen delegates, representing Libya, the Ukraine, Poland, the German
Democratic Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Norway,
Austria, Hungary, Byelorussia, Rumania, Uganda, the Holy See, and
Mongolia, took the floor to speak unreservedly against the French proposal.97
Almost all these delegates said that the mere omission of the term "reprisals"
did not change the essential nature of the measures that had been suggested.
Mr. Rechetniak of the Ukraine saw in them an obvious application of the tra-
ditional jus talionis;98 Mr. Ktkolecki of Poland considered them a step back-
wards in comparison with the Geneva Conventions.99 To Professor Graefrath
of the German Democratic Republic, it was also an endeavor to revise the arti-
cles that already had been adopted by two other committees. Graefrath also
predicted that in the event of disparity of forces between belligerents, the
measures advocated by France would clearly be to the advantage of the
stronger of them and work against the weaker. 100 Mr. Bobylev of the U.S.S.R.
and Mr. Eide from Norway feared that any such measures would primarily
make the innocent suffer. 10 1 According to Mr. Kussbach of Austria, the pro-
posal confused two concepts: responsibility of states under international law
and responsibility of individuals under criminal law.102 Mr. Kiralyi of
Hungary pointed to the potential danger of decisions being taken arbitrarily
by a party on the basis of purely subjective criteria. 10 3 Mr. Baba of Uganda
cautioned against the same danger and asked how the party applying the sug-
gested measures could be sure that they would deter the adverse party from
actions such as the ones taken initially instead of embittering the adversary
still more.'0 4 The most vigorous attack came from Msgr. Luoni, representing
the Holy See, who denounced the French proposal as incompatible with the
fundamental principles of humanitarian law. Luoni asserted:
Indeed, to admit that a party to a conflict could, in certain more or less well-
defined cases, have recourse to reprisals would sanction the idea that that
lamentable practice was legitimate and would change it from a deplorable de
95. Id. at 55, 60-61 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 29-31, 32-35); id. at 67, 72-78 (CDDH/I/SR.47,
paras. 28-32, 47-51); id. at 83, 85-89 (CDDH/I/SR.48, paras. 9-13, 18-23).
96. Id. at 83, 86 (CDDH/I/SR.48, paras. 14-16).
97. Id. at 55, 60-63 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 28, 36-40, 41-44; id. at 67, 70-80 (CDDH/
I/SR.47, paras. 20-27, 39-41, 42-46, 52, 53-58, 59-60); id. at 83-95 (CDDH/lI/SR.48, paras.
1, 29, 30-39, 57).
98. Id. at 61-63 (CDDH/I/SR.46, paras. 36-40).
99. Id. at 63 (CDDH/I/SR.46, para. 41).
100. See Graefrath, Dritte Sitzung der Genfer Konferenz zur Weiterentwicklung des humanitren
VdIkerrechts, in DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 1976, at 156.
101. 9 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 74-76 (CDDH/I/SR.47, paras. 49-56).
102. Id. at 78 (CDDH/I/SR.47, para. 52).
103. Id. at 79 (CDDH/I/SR.47, para. 56).
104. Id. at 90 (CDDH/I/SR.48, para. 29).
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facto practice to one regulated by law, which would be inadmissible. . . . It
was, however, unthinkable from the legal standpoint that any means which
were themselves a violation of humanitarian law could be codified. That
would be neither more nor less than a revised and amended law of retalia-
tion. 105
In his reply, M. Girard expressed regret over the disagreement his pro-
posal had caused: this, he felt, was due to a misunderstanding. He explained
that he did not want to elude any prohibitions-he would be only too happy
if the measures suggested would never have to be applied and thought that
the mere menace would prove sufficient to dissuade the adverse party from
violating its obligations under international law. However, he "could not agree
that humanitarian law should result in protecting those who violated it at the
expense of those who respected it."' 0°
After the discussion of the French proposal, when the time came to dis-
cuss the Polish one, Mr. Ktkolecki restricted himself to stating briefly that
whatever had been said in reference to the French proposal applied indirectly
to the Polish proposal. He thus considered as his supporters all those who had
spoken against the proposal of the French delegation."0 7 The Polish proposal
was supported by a few other delegates; 0 8 Mr. Bettauer of the United States
was at that meeting the only one to expressly oppose it.'0 9
At that juncture, Committee I stopped discussing the problem of reprisals
and eventually decided to refer the issue as a whole to its Working Group B,
for further consideration." 0 It was there, from April 19 to 21, 1977, that
what was perhaps the most interesting discussion of the subject took place."'
E. Working Group B
This time, the discussion was inaugurated by the representative of
Poland," 12 whose delegation had limited itself in the full committee to some
very brief introductory remarks towards the end of the meeting at which the
French proposal was discussed.
The delegate of Poland first said that the very fact that his delegation was
represented this time by a person who normally took part in the work of an-
other committee" 3 could perhaps be construed as having a symbolic mean-
ing-namely, that the problem of reprisals, though referred to Committee
I for consideration, had never ceased to interest the other committees.
105. Id. at 91 (CDDH/I/SR.48, paras. 32, 37).
106. Id. at 83, 93-94 (CDDH/I/SR.48, paras. 46-51).
107. Id. at para. 53.
108. Id. at paras. 52, 55, 56.
109. Id. at para. 54.
110. Id. at 349 (CDDH/I/SR.66, paras. 3-4) (meeting of April 14, 1977).
111. Since the meetings of the working groups are not recorded, the author has taken the lib-
erty of referring in the following paragraphs to his personal notes.
112. The delegate was the author.
113. The author was the Chairman of Main Committee II.
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The speaker explained, "It is alas well-known how often recourse to
reprisals-in retaliation for the conduct, whether proven or only imputed, of
the adverse party-was invoked in justification of most atrocious cruelties per-
petrated against the innocent." "The fundamental injustice of reprisals
consists in that very fact-of their being usually directed against the inno-
cent," he continued, classing this among the inherent features of reprisals.
"They are thus equivalent to a collective punishment," he declared, "the very
notion of which must be abhorrent to any civilized man." "We are-and al-
ways shall be-in favor of'punishing grave breaches committed by individuals,
provided, however, that such punishment be inflicted on those who have been
found personally guilty of such breaches."
"There are many cases in which reprisals entirely failed their purported
aim," the Polish delegate continued-"they usually led to counter-reprisals
and, in the final analysis, to an escalation of atrocities inexorably contributing
to make of an armed conflict a truly Dantesque hell." He then reminded his
fellow delegates that many distinguished Western writers-some of whom he
quoted-had been against reprisals. Reprisals had also been prohibited by a
number of treaty rules and had been solemnly condemned in many resolu-
tions of the U.N. General Assembly. He thought, therefore, that the predomi-
nant trend in contemporary international law was towards the elimination of
reprisals. "It would be," he said, "a paradoxical step backwards if the recourse
to reprisals, under whatever name, were to be authorized by our Protocols.
Far from protecting the victims of armed conflicts, any such provision would
encourage the belligerent arbitrarily to make them suffer."
The representative of Poland regretted that his own initiative to refer the
whole problem of reprisals to a mixed working group had failed. As the mat-
ter now stood, after several articles containing a specific clause on reprisals
had been adopted in either Committee II or Committee III, during which
time neither committee was conversant with the work done by the other, sev-
eral categories of persons and objects were not covered by any prohibition of
reprisals.
The speaker named some of these categories: remains of the deceased, 
4
enemies hors de combat,"15 occupants of aircraft,' 6 members of the armed
forces and military units assigned to civil defense organizations, 1 7 women and
children vulnerable to rape, forced prostitution, or indecent assault,118 and,
finally, undefended localities and demilitarized zones." 9 Could such persons
114. Protocol I, supra note 47, at art. 34.
115. Id. at art. 41.
116. Id. at art. 42.
117. Id. at art. 67.
118. Id. at arts. 76, 77. Note that the prohibition contained in article 51, paragraph 6, protects
civilians only against attacks, defined in article 49.
119. Id. at arts. 59. 60.
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and objects be exposed to reprisals? An interpreter in bad faith would be able
to argue that they could, given the lack of a specific prohibition of reprisals in
any of the provisions mentioned above, when highly specific prohibition does
appear in articles on the protection of other persons and objects. The chief
reason the Polish delegation insisted so vigorously on the inclusion of a general
prohibition in Protocol I was to exclude the possibility of any such interpreta-
tion.
So as not to reopen the discussion in the main committees that already had
adopted specific prohibitory clauses, the speaker suggested that if the Polish
proposal should be adopted, the Drafting Committee might be entrusted with
the task of deleting the specific prohibitions that would, in such a case, be-
come redundant.
To retain the prohibition of reprisals against certain categories of persons
and objects yet fail to prohibit reprisals against others that deserve a similar
protection would be tantamount, concluded the representative of Poland, "to
leav[ing] open not the door perhaps, but at the very least a chink through
which a wolf would be able to penetrate into our sheep-fold."
Ambassador Paolini, who in 1977 replaced M. Girard as the head of the
French delegation, limited himself in the working group to a rather short
speech. He merely reminded the audience of what his predecessor had said
previously. The French delegation next presented a somewhat redrafted text,
in which some of the remarks made in the former discussion were taken into
consideration. The term "reprisals" did not appear anywhere; the proposal
merely spoke about "exceptional measures in the event of grave breaches."
Such measures would be applied in exceptional situations when it would be
impossible for a government not to react against "grave, manifest and deliber-
ate" violations of law committed by the adverse party. 2 ° These "exceptional
measures" should thus be considered to have been taken in the exercise of the
right of legitimate self-defense, which could not be denied to anyone. The ex-
ercise of this right would be subject to several conditions: rigorous ob-
servation of the principle of proportionality; 1 21 obligation to warn the adverse
party of the measures that are intended;12 2 insurance that the measures
would be of the same kind as those to which the adverse party itself had re-
sorted; 23 cessation of measures as soon as they achieve their aim; 24 and the
decision to apply them to be taken "at the highest level of the government."'' 25
The speaker finally assured the working group that such prohibitions as those
formulated both in the Conventions and in the Protocol would be retained.
120. 10 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 217, 218 (CDDH/I/GT/107/Rev. 1).
121. Id. at para. 3.
122. Id. at para. 2(c).
123. Id. at para. 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. at para. 2(b).
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Considering the Polish proposal, M. Paolini expressed the opinion that it
would "overburden [surchargerait]" the text of the Protocol, in which several
prohibitions already were to be found: the Polish proposal would not, so far
as he could see, add anything new and would therefore be redundant. 126
After these two introductory statements, more than forty speakers asked
for the floor, and three full days had to be devoted exclusively to what be-
came a general debate on reprisals. Each of the proposals submitted found
supporters and opponents. So did nearly every suggestion made in the
discussion. The following are some of the most interesting points that were
raised.
Several speakers expressed their doubts about the French representative's
contention that many of the reservations formulated during the former dis-
cussion had been taken into consideration in the new version of the French
proposal. The delegates of the Holy See, Vietnam, and Byelorussia remarked
that the mere addition or deletion of one word or another, or even the
change of the title in the proposed new article, did not change what had all
along constituted its very essence: the admissibility of arbitrarily resorting to
measures otherwise prohibited. The representative of Vietnam went so far as
to say that the replacement of the term "reprisals" by another served no other
purpose than to "deceive public opinion [tromper 1' opinion publique]."
The delegate of Switzerland said that the acceptance of the French pro-
posal would be an advantage to the middle-sized and small states. He was,
however, opposed by the representatives of the German Democratic Republic
and Venezuela. These delegates maintained that this was far from accurate:
the developed countries that possess modern weapons to which smaller states
have no access would be the only winners.
The Swiss delegate also contended that no comparison should be made be-
tween the measures suggested and the collective penalties: the former were
applicable to states, the latter to individuals. That opinion was labeled a mere
sophism by the delegate of Poland. The man in the street would suffer in ex-
actly the same way in either capacity; as an individual or as a citizen of his
state he would become, without any personal guilt, the victin" of retaliatory
measures.
The assertion of the representative of France that the acceptance of his
proposal would mark progress in the development of humanitarian law found
its chief opponents in the delegates of Mexico and Tunisia. The first said that
this could open the way to total anarchy; the second maintained that to place
the article submitted by France next to those protecting human persons would
be equivalent to taking away with the left hand what was given with the right.
The same two delegates strongly objected to the contention of the Cana-
126. The summary of M. Paolini's speech also is based on personal notes taken by the author.
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dian, Belgian, and United States delegates, who had praised the "realistic" ap-
proach of the French proposal. The Tunisian and Mexican delegates main-
tained that, to the contrary, it would be unrealistic to think that the suggested
article would not lead to the most cynical misuses.
The delegates of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Federal Republic
of Germany thought that the mere threat of the application of "exceptional
measures" would have a salutary effect, in that it would dissuade belligerents
from violating the law. This opinion, however, was contradicted by several
speakers. The delegates of Finland and Spain feared an escalation of atroci-
ties; the delegate from Mexico foresaw the danger of giving a pseudolegal
weapon to the disloyal belligerent that would seek to elude commitments. The
representative of the Holy See resisted the creation of a loophole through
which any reprisals eventually would be able to slip. The delegates of Vietnam
and Nigeria claimed that leaving so much to the arbitrary judgment of the
party concerned, which would be guided by purely subjective criteria, was an
enormous risk. Those from Venezuela and the Philippines feared the risk of
widely divergent interpretations of so controversial a text.
Some divergencies of a more formal nature also arose. For instance, the
representative of the United Kingdom saw no relation whatsoever between
the measures suggested and those prohibited by the Charter of the United
Nations, while the Syrian delegate found them to be contrary to article 2, par-
agraph 4 of the Charter.
In addition, some delegates questioned whether it would be possible in
practice to observe the provisions of both the Geneva Conventions and the
Protocol, despite the reservations contained in the French proposal. The ef-
forts of the United States representative did not render too great a service to
the cause of the French proposal, which he otherwise supported by expressly
providing, in a kind of subamendment, 27 for the possibility of evading some
of the prohibitions if these had first been violated by the adverse party.
A procedural point was raised by the representative of the German Demo-
cratic Republic: Was it still possible to question prohibitions that already had
been adopted in due form by Committee II and Committee III?
Another formal question concerned the very authority of the Conference
to deal with a problem which, to a considerable degree, exceeded the scope of
the "Geneva law" (protection of victims of armed conflicts) and merged with
that of the "Hague law" (conduct of hostilities). Allusions to this problem were
made, in various contexts, by the delegates of the United States, Poland,
Yugoslavia, and Iraq.
Also among the formal issues considered by the group was the position of
127. This proposal is mentioned in the Committee's report, CDDH/405/Rev.I, Annex II,
para. 6, as CDDH/I/ GT/109. 10 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 217, 218.
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some of the speakers, especially those representing Vietnam and the Philip-
pines, that the Polish proposal had merit in its very brevity. The Swedish rep-
resentative expressed another interesting opinion: the French proposal would
have constituted remarkable progress if it had been put forward a hundred
years ago; in the second half of the twentieth century, however, it was retro-
grade.
The delegate of Poland, taking the floor again towards the end of the
discussion, observed that none of the supporters of the French proposal, nor
even the French representative himself, had answered two of his fundamental
questions: Would reprisals be permissible against persons or objects protected
by the Protocol but not covered by any of the specific prohibitions of repri-
sals? and What kind of measures were meant as being "exceptional"-would
any kind of weapons be excluded, or would the party resorting to "excep-
tional measures" be allowed to use any of them?
In the course of the discussion, an additional development transpired. Pro-
fessor Abdine of Syria reintroduced a proposal that Syria had made at the
first session of the Conference. This stipulated that in the event of any grave
breach of either the Geneva Conventions or the Protocol, the parties would
act, jointly or severally, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations
and in cooperation with the appropriate organs of that organization. The Pol-
ish delegation agreed, at one point, to add the text of this amendment as a
second paragraph to its original proposal, which would thus become the first
paragraph of the joint proposal. 128
After the debate described above, it became perfectly clear that a consen-
sus could not be reached on either of the two essentially divergent texts. The
working group therefore decided to refer the matter back to Committee I,
where a formal vote would have to be taken. Whatever the result, it was clear
that any victory would be a Pyrrhic one.
F. Main Committee I Again
When the question next appeared on the agenda of the full committee, M.
Paolini, for the French delegation, and Mr. K4kolecki, for the Polish delega-
tion, took the floor to announce that they were withdrawing their respective
proposals.
1 29
This, however, was a compromise the Syrian delegation did not en-
dorse.1 30 Consequently, the Syrian part of what originally had been a Polish
128. Id. at 217, 219(CDDH/I/GT/113).
129. 9 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 417-18 (CDDH/I/SR.72, paras. 3, 4, 11)
(meeting of May 13, 1977).
130. Id. at para. 5.
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amendment was independently put to the vote. After it was adopted by a vote
of forty-one to eighteen, with seventeen abstentions, 131 it became article 89 of
the final text of Protocol I. It reads:
In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the
High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-
operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations
Charter.
Without knowing of the unrecorded debate in the working group, one would
hardly guess that this innocent provision is the only remnant of two endeav-
ors to insert in the Protocol a general clause on reprisals!
The vote on the Syrian amendment was followed by a few interesting ex-
planations of vote that were submitted in writing. 32 The delegations of
France and Poland declared that they had withdrawn their respective propos-
als exclusively in the "spirit of compromise" without abandoning their original
positions. 133 Two other delegates expressed their regrets at the withdrawal of
proposals they had supported-the delegate of Cameroun, the French pro-
posal; the delegate of Syria, the Polish proposal.' 34 The representative of the
Holy See was disappointed that Committee I had "lost the opportunity of
stating clearly, precisely and unequivocally that reprisals are prohibited by hu-
manitarian law."' 35
The explanations given by the delegations of Mexico and Yugoslavia were
particularly significant. Had the vote taken place, the delegate of Mexico
would have voted not only against the French proposal but against the Polish
one as well since, in his opinion, it did not go far enough: the mention of the
"protected" persons and objects could be construed as allowing reprisals
against those who were not specifically protected by the Geneva Conventions
or the Protocol. 36 The delegation of Yugoslavia would have voted for the
Polish proposal, although it considered the proposal too modest in scope and
thus "should still have been worried about the question of reprisals against
the adversary in combat." The Yugoslavian delegation also expressed deep re-
gret that the lack of any general provision on reprisals "leaves us in the fog of
customary law."' 37
131. Id. at para. 7.
132. See id. at 427, 435-59 (CDDH/I/SR.73, Annex passim).
133. Id. at 427, 443-44, 452 (CDDH/I/SR.73).
134. Id. at 427, 453-55.
135. Id. at 427, 447.
136. Id. at 427, 449-50.
137. Id. at 427, 456-57 (CDDH/I/SR.73, Annex). For a short survey of what the Committee
did on reprisals, see its report of its work during the fourth session, 10 CDDH OFFICIAL RE-
CORDS, supra note 44, at 181, 184-85 (CDDH/405/Rev. 1, paras. 20-30).
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G. Plenary Meeting
Since no general provision on reprisals was to be found in the texts the
Conference had to approve in plenary meetings, some delegations took the
opportunity to say a few words about the problem of reprisals as a whole--or,
quite often, their reasons for joining the consensus-when specific prohibitory
clauses were raised in the plenary meetings. Speaking in reference to draft ar-
ticle 46 (article 51 in the final text), the representative of Poland 1 38 explained
that, "[t]he whole article, with its general rules, would fill some of the gaps in
existing rules of a more specific character. It represented a coherent whole."
This speaker added that his delegation likewise was supporting unreservedly
all the following articles-wherever a prohibition of reprisals had been in-
serted. 139
According to the Swedish delegate, "[t]he rules laid down in Articles 46 to
50 are to be considered as a 'package' including important and clearly ex-
pressed rules, where humanitarian considerations are balanced in a very good
way against military requirements. 1 40 In another context, the same delegate
observed that "the threat of reciprocal treatment would always be real to
those who violated the rules of humanitarian law . . .but that a formal legali-
zation of reprisals would be an invitation to misuse and abuse.' ' 41
For Professor Alghunaimi, who spoke on behalf of Egypt, the whole group
of articles in question represented "an advance in the reaffirmation and de-
velopment of international humanitarian law." He was "fully aware that by
prohibiting reprisals those articles were a departure from the customary rules
of international law." His delegation accepted them in compliance with "the
philosophy of Islam and the ethics of Arab chivalry."'1 42 The delegation of
Qatar expressed a similar view.1 43
Only the delegation of Australia opposed all prohibitions of reprisals that
concerned a category of objects, although it unreservedly supported all rules
prohibiting reprisals against persons. Reprisals, to that delegation, were not
acts of vengeance but sanctions the availability of which "may persuade an ad-
versary not to commit violations of the law in the first place." Therefore, the
Australian delegation abstained in the vote on draft article 47 (article 52 of
the final text) and also would have abstained in the vote on several subse-
quent articles (accepted by a consensus it did not want to oppose) if they had
been put to the vote. 44 But this was an isolated voice. No other delegation
138. The author.
139. 6 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 141, 166 (CDDH/SR.41, paras. 130-31).
140. Id. at 199.
141. Id. at 205, 210 (CDDH/SR.42, at para. 35).
142. Id. at 205, 209-10 (CDDH/SR. 42, at para. 31).
143. Id. at 219, 234 (CDDH/SR.42, Annex).
144. Id. at 175 (CDDH/SR.41, Annex).
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among those that had supported the French proposal in the working group
made any similar statement.
H. The Problem of Reprisals in Protocol II
Draft Protocol II, relating to the protection of victims of noninternational
armed conflicts, contained two clauses prohibiting reprisals: one, "against the
wounded, the sick and the shipwrecked as well as against medical personnel,
medical units and means of medical transport";14 and the other, "against the
civilian population or civilians." 1
4
"
Doubts were raised as soon as the first of these provisions appeared on the
agenda of Main Committee II. One group of delegates wanted to assure the
victims of noninternational conflicts a protection analogous to that which the
victims of international conflicts enjoyed. Others thought that, to the contrary,
reprisals were an institution applicable only to international relations; ap-
plying the same criteria to conflicts not having an international character did
not seem possible to these delegates. Yet another group of delegates sought a
compromise solution by trying to substitute for the term "reprisals" some
other expression-for example, "measures of retaliation comparable
to reprisals." Aware of the possibility of similar discrepancies in the work of
other committees, the Chairman of Committee II sought to set up a small
mixed group, composed of no more than two delegates from each Com-
mittee, which would try to elaborate a solution acceptable to everyone. For
various reasons, however, such a mixed group was never convened. 147
In the meantime, Main Committee III was confronted with exactly the
same problem. Here, however, the reaction was entirely different. While the
ICRC draft Protocol limited itself to prohibiting reprisals only against the ci-
vilian population, Committee III introduced such a prohibition into articles
dealing with the protection of certain categories of objects as well. Neverthe-
less, all those clauses were put into square brackets, for the Committee de-
cided to postpone the vote on them "until the question had been resolved for
draft Protocols I and II in general."'1 48
Main Committee I, after considering the problem within its Working
Group B, drafted a general provision on the subject, which would cover, on
145. Draft Protocol II, supra note 45, at art. 19.
146. Id. at art. 26, para. 4.
147. For the story of the problem in Committee II, see 11 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra
note 44, at 281, 290-91 (CDDH/II/SR.28, paras. 59-64); id. at 327, 335-37 (CDDH/II/SR.32,
paras. 49-59); id. at 339-47 (CDDHIII/SR.33, paras. 1-50); id. at 551, 562-65 (CDDH/II/SR.49,
paras. 69-78). See also the Committee's report of its work during the second session, 13 CDDH
OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 59, 132 (CDDH/221/Rev.1, paras. 177-81).
148. 15 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 263, 291 (CDDH/215/Rev.I, paras. 127,
134, 141, 151-52). On the referral of the whole problem to Committee I, see the report of
Committee III of the fourth session, CDDH/III/406, para. 70.
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the one hand, persons in the power of the adverse party-all the sick,
wounded, and shipwrecked, as well as the civilian population; and, on the
other hand, objects that would be indispensable for the survival of civilians
and objects containing dangerous forces.' 49 This article, adopted by a rather
feeble majority,t15 ran as follows: "The provisions of Parts II and III and of
articles ...shall not, in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be
violated, even in response to a violation of the provisions of the Protocol."''
However, toward the end of the fourth session of the Conference, Proto-
col II as a whole (for reasons that lead beyond the scope of the present study)
was opposed by a comparatively strong group of delegations. After much ne-
gotiation, when it was clear that Protocol II could be saved only at the price
of being considerably shortened, none of the articles that the supporters of
Protocol II succeeded in saving contained any clause on reprisals under any
denomination. At the most, the prohibition of "collective punishments" and of
"taking of hostages," listed among the "fundamental guarantees, '' 52 could
perhaps be considered to give the victims of noninternational conflicts some
minimum protection against measures comparable to reprisals.
CONCLUSION
Let us try to forget which particular delegations were fighting at Geneva
to insert a general prohibition of reprisals in Protocol Is' and which were
pushing for a provision expressly authorizing the resort to reprisals when cer-
tain condtions are met. To discuss the matter objectively, as a purely academic
question, let us refer to the first of the proposals mentioned above as "solu-
tion A," to the second as "solution B."
Had solution A been adopted, it would have become perfectly clear that all
persons and all objects protected by the Geneva Conventions and by the Pro-
tocol are immune to reprisals. To this writer, it would have been advisable to
add one more item, namely the "remains of deceased,"' 154 as the question
could be raised whether they should be classified as "persons" or "objects" or
perhaps even a distinct category somewhere between the two.
As the matter now stands, only specific categories of persons and objects
are protected from reprisals. Even if those categories comprise most of the
persons and objects mentioned in the Protocol, some have been excluded. This
149. For a survey of the work done by Committee 1, see its report in 10 CDDH OrICsAL RE-
cORDs, supra note 44, at 202 (CDDHI405/Rev.1, paras. 125-130).
150. By 33 votes to 15, with 28 abstentions. For discussion preceding this vote, see 9 CDDH
OFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 427-30 (CDDH/I/SR.73, paras. 8-23).
151. 10 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 234 (CDDH/I/GT/95).
152. Protocol II, supra note 47, at art. 4, para. 2.
153. Protocol II, concerning noninternational conflicts, would pose entirely different prob-
lems; it is therefore not considered in the following remarks.
154. Protocol 1, supra note 47, at art. 34.
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writer, in a speech to Working Group B of Main Committee I, enumerated
the ones that had been omitted. No one answered his question about the legal
position of these persons and objects, although many supporters of solution B
took the floor after him. The possibility of an a contrario reasoning (inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius), allowing persons or objects not covered specifically by
any of the prohibitory clauses to be lawfully exposed to reprisals, cannot be
excluded. Should such interpretation occur, the lack of a general prohibitory
provision would prove, too late, how misguided the Conference had been. To
quote the words of the delegation of the Holy See, the Conference lost the
"opportunity of stating clearly, precisely and unequivocally that reprisals are
prohibited by humanitarian law."'1 55
As for solution B, what a dangerous loophole it would have left in the pro-
hibition of reprisals, if it had been adopted, can easily be argued. What an en-
couraging field for any malafide interpretation! The more conditions and res-
ervations, the more temptations-and opportunities-for evasion. And what a
paradox: anyone evading the prohibition of reprisals would be able to invoke
an express authorization of a treaty on humanitarian law. Fortunately no
loophole of this sort has been left open-not explicitly, at any rate.
But what if a state, in a given case, has absolutely no other means of re-
acting against a "manifest and deliberate" violation of law by the unscrupu-
lous enemy than a recourse to a similar action? Let the state then, in case of
doubt, invoke the plea of unavoidable necessity or legitimate self-defense
(possibly before some tribunal or commission) rather than let it invoke an ex-
press and, though perhaps well-meant, double-edged clause of a treaty boast-
ing of its "humanitarian" nature. The law of our times is haunted by the dan-
ger of overcodification. Already well-known in many countries in the field of
domestic law, this trend persists in trying to invade international law as well.
Let us not become the victims of that danger. There are things better left
uncodified: the potential offender should not be given what might easily be
construed as an escape clause.
On the other hand, solution B could perhaps play a useful role in a field
where as yet no prohibition of reprisals has ever been introduced: 156 in the
law pertaining to the conduct of military operations, frequently referred to as
the "law of The Hague." The state of that law is certainly much more con-
fused and chaotic 157 than is the state of the "Geneva law." This may be due,
in part, to the fact that no body .exists to develop this branch of law as the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross does with respect to the Geneva law.
155. 9 CDDH OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 44, at 427, 447 (CDDH/I/SR.73, Annex).
156. See, e.g., E. CASTRtN, supra note 31, at 70; M. GREENSPAN, supra note 32, at 408; F.
KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 112-13 (1973).
157. See, e.g., Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their Revi-
sion, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 37 (1951); E. CASTRiN, supra note 31, at 20.
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The International Law Commission of the United Nations expressly declined
to deal with the jus in bello altogether.158 Perhaps the government of the
Netherlands, in its capacity as the depositary of the Hague Conventions, could
be induced to take the initiative of convening first a group of experts and
then a diplomatic conference. Should that ever happen, solution B could pro-
vide welcome progress over the existing law at that juncture.
To this writer's mind, an ideal goal would be: solution A (prohibition) for
the Geneva law; solution B (regulation) for the law of The Hague. Will that
ever be attained? It would, in any event, be worth striving for. Scholars, as
well as governments and international organizations, would be well-advised to
embark on this difficult but interesting and important task.
158. See the report of that Committee on its first session held in 1949, pt. I, ch. 1, para. 18.
U.N. Doc. A/925.
